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Non-technical summary 
We estimate the effects of the introduction of the Unemployment Benefit II (UBII) as reform 
of the German Unemployment Insurance that replaced the wage related Unemployment 
Assistance with an income maintenance program and stronger means testing.  
We model the German tax-benefit system and use the waves of the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP) for 2004 and 2005. We define the “Group A” as people who are 
“Affected” by the reform. Within this Group A, we also subsume people who were not 
eligible to any benefits in the status quo and who become eligible after the reform. 
The aim of the paper is twofold. First we are interested in the distributional effects of the 
reform for the entire population and for several subgroups. Second, we estimate a discrete 
labour supply model to estimate the labour supply effects. Furthermore we use the 
estimation results to simulate the distributional effects that correspond to the labour supply 
effects by applying the pseudo-distribution method.   
 
The introduction of UB II has led to a consolidation of the benefit system. The presumption 
that people who used to receive high UA-benefits because they had higher earnings 
(before unemployment) are losing most is confirmed. We find that six deciles (seven 
deciles) are losing income as a consequence of the reform with consideration of 
behavioural effects (without behavioural effects). We identify reform winners in the 
subgroups of (1) former recipients of social assistance and of (2) new recipients. The 
largest gains accrue to households with many children and to households who have not 
been eligible for any benefits before. These households become eligible, because of the 
less restrictive non-earned-income test compared to the old social assistance. For the 
whole group of benefit recipients, namely "Group A", we find a reduction of the income 
inequality accompanied by a positive effect on the poverty measures. This effect is in line 
with the theoretical considerations. The new benefit system has a tendency to equalize the 
transfer payments on a level that is slightly higher than the old social assistance level. 
These results are also confirmed by the labour supply effects.  We find negative 
participation effects for women with children in couple and single households.  In the 
opposite, couples without children, single men and women without children increase their 
participation. These contrary effects nearly cancel out and are not significant in either 
direction. Thus, the net employment effect of the reform is negligible.  
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Abstract:  
We estimate the effects of the reform of the German Unemployment Insurance that 
replaced the wage related Unemployment Assistance with an income maintenance 
program and stronger means testing. We model the tax-benefit system and use the Socio-
Economic Panel. We estimate a discrete labour supply model and simulate the 
behavioural and distributional effects using the pseudo-distribution method. Poverty and 
inequality decline overall, since households with children and low income gain, while those 
who used to earn high wages and received high unemployment transfers lose most. The 
behavioural responses mitigate the redistributive impact of the reform. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The German labour market reform – which became known as Hartz IV, due to the head of 
the “Commission to modernize the labour market“: Peter Hartz- came into effect on 
January 1st, 2005. The main feature of this reform is the replacement of the earnings 
related Unemployment Assistance (UA) with an income maintenance system, called 
"Unemployment Benefit II" that is unrelated to former earnings. Unemployment Assistance 
used to be paid to unemployed after their eligibility for Unemployment Benefits (UB) had 
been exhausted. UB or (UB I as it is called after the reform) was not changed by the 
reform. It still offers a replacement rate of 60 percent for persons without dependent 
children and 67 percent for others. The replacement rate of UA used to be 53 percent for 
persons with dependent children or 50 percent for all others. UA was paid under the 
condition of a relatively weak means test. The new assistance UB II is basically a 
redefined Social Assistance (or Welfare program). Thus, it is not related to former wages 
and it uses a much stricter means test than the old UA. The former Welfare program was 
also restructured and divided into two branches: (1) Social Assistance for persons 
temporarily unable to work and (2) "Unemployment Benefits II" for persons considered 
being labour market participants meaning persons with a capacity to work at least 3 hours 
a day. Persons who are permanently disabled or retired are covered by a third branch of 
Social Assistance. The new UB II is, in effect, a minimum income program for all 
households in which at least one person is considered to be a labour force participant (i.e. 
working or able to work). 
The aim of our study is to evaluate the impact of this reform on the income distribution and 
on household labour supply. We are interested in the distributional effects for the total 
population and for several important subgroups such as former recipients of UA or welfare 
and new recipients of transfers. Since the reform may induce considerable changes in 
household behaviour, namely labour supply, we also want to capture these effects with our 
microeconometric model. As a by-product of our analysis, we can characterise changes in 
labour supply for recipients and non-recipients. These changes in labour supply will in turn 
change the distributional consequences of the reform. The redistributive effects may be 
mitigated or exacerbated by the labour supply reactions (provided that changes in labour 
supply translate into changes in employment). 
There have been several previous studies on the distributional effect of the Hartz-IV-
Reform. Schulte (2004) finds that about 59 percent of the former recipients of UA lose 
income after the reform. Blos and Rudolph (2005), who use the 2003 Income and 
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Expenditure Survey, estimate that even two-thirds of former UA-recipients are off worse. 
Becker and Hauser (2006) use the 2003 waves of the Income and Expenditure Survey and 
GSOEP arrive at similar conclusions. All three studies have in common that they only 
consider former recipients of UA and thus only one subgroup that is affected by the reform. 
They do not consider two important groups: (i) former recipients of Social Assistance (SA) 
that switch to UB II and (ii) new recipients that become eligible under the new rules. Thus, 
their distributional analysis remains incomplete. As Blos (2006) shows, based on the 
Income and Expenditure survey, the number of new transfer recipients reaches about 
730,000 households or 1.5 percent of all German households. Moreover, none of the 
former studies estimates the second-round effects that are induced by changes in labour 
supply. Thus, they may miss important shifts of the income distribution. Given the recent 
literature, the contribution of our paper is twofold. First, we extend the analysis to the entire 
population, yielding a complete description of the income distribution. We can then break 
down the results into several subgroups. Secondly, we apply a behavioural 
microsimulation model with an integrated household labour supply model in order to gauge 
the second-round effects. 
Behavioural microsimulation models have been used in many studies of tax-benefit 
reforms in different countries. Blundell et al. (2000) give an excellent application for the 
introduction of the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) for the UK. For Spain, Labeaga, 
Olivier and Spadaro (2005) evaluate the likely effects of some changes to the tax-scheme. 
Other examples are Hoynes (1996), Keane and Moffitt (1998) for the US, Van Soest and 
Das (2001) for the Netherlands or Aaberge et al. (2000) for Italy, Sweden and Norway. 
Gerfin and Leu (2003) have determined the impact of in-work benefits on poverty and 
household labour supply in Switzerland. Beninger et al. (2004) evaluate the effects of 
replacing the German marital tax splitting with the French family tax splitting. In the context 
of a distributional analysis, Creedy et al. (2003) have applied a behavioural 
microsimulation model to simulate distributional and labour supply effects in a discrete 
hours approach. Creedy et al. (2004) propose the pseudo random distribution method as a 
superior method to use in distributional analysis. In our distribution analysis, we follow this 
approach and use the pseudo random distribution method. We extend the ZEW 
behavioural microsimulation model. Our empirical analysis is based on the 2004 and 2005 
waves of the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the following section 2, we present 
a description of the German labour market reform. In Section 3 we briefly describe the 
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dataset, the microsimulation, and the household labour supply model.1 In Section 4 we 
illustrate how we apply our behavioural microsimulation model to conduct an analysis of 
changes in the income distribution and changes in poverty. The results are presented in 
Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
THE GERMAN LABOUR MARKET REFORM OF 2005 
 
The old system before 2005 
The old Unemployment Assistance (UA) was a federal transfer financed by general taxes 
and administered by the Federal Employment Agency. It was only available for persons 
who had been eligible for Unemployment Benefits, after eligibility for UB ended. Other 
unemployed persons or needy households could only apply for Social Assistance. 
Unemployment Benefits (UB) were only paid for a limited period, depending on the age of 
the recipient and on the duration of former employment. Unemployment Benefits have not 
been affected by the reform. However, they are now called "UB I" in order to distinguish 
them from the new "UB II". The replacement rates of UB are 67 percent for persons with 
dependent children (irrespective of the number of children) and 60 percent for all others. In 
the UA, the replacement rates used to be lower at 57 and 53 percent, respectively. 
Housing allowances were usually paid on top of the unemployment transfers, depending 
on household composition, income, and rent. If the household income falls short of a 
minimum income (depending on household composition and rent) additional Social 
Assistance is paid. Thus, a household with an unemployed person may collect transfers 
from three different sources: UA/UB, housing allowance, and Social Assistance. At the end 
of the year 2004, before the reform of the unemployment assistance was enacted, 4.13 
million persons between the age of 15 and 65 received Unemployment Assistance and / or 
Social assistance. Since Social assistance is a residual transfer there were 210,000 
persons who received both, UA and Social Assistance, in cases in which UA did not 
suffice to reach the minimum income level. However, the majority of households with UA-
recipients made a living above the minimum income level, since UA is usually not the only 
source of income. 
Recipients of UA were subject to a relatively strict earnings test, a less strict income test, 
and an even weaker wealth test. They could earn up to a maximum of 20 percent of their 
Unemployment Assistance transfer, or a minimum of 165 Euro. If the information on the 
                                                 
1See Creedy and Kalb (2005) for a complementary description of the modelling specification. 
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Unemployment Benefit is missing in our model, we recalculate the potential benefit by 
multiplying the UA with the factors 60/53 or 67/57 for households with children. The 
number of working hours was limited to 15 hours per week under UA, and the whole 
payment was withdrawn as soon as this threshold was reached. There were also special 
allowances for the recipient's non-earned income and for the partner's income. The wealth 
test used to be relatively weak compared to the situation after the reform. Recipients of UA 
were also covered by health and long-term care insurance. Moreover, pension 
contributions were made on behalf of the recipient. Several social transfers, like child 
benefits and housing allowances were not counted in the means test. Almost 60 percent of 
UA recipients received between 300 and 600 Euro per month (Employment Agency, 
December 2004). About 30 percent of the recipients received between 600 to 900 Euros. 
The Social Assistance (SA) supplied a minimum income that was available to all 
households below a certain minimum income - regardless of the labour force status of the 
household members. The assistance depends on the number and income of persons in 
the household sharing their financial resources ("Bedarfsgemeinschaft"). There also 
existed allowances for earned income up to 50 percent of the standard benefit. After 
reaching this limit, earned income was taxed away at 100 percent. The allowances for 
non-earned income were less generous than this. In the case of SA they were also less 
generous than in the case of UA. 
In order to demonstrate the effect of the reform we display stylised budget constraints in 
the following figures. We show examples single mothers with one child, for recipients of 
UA and of SA (see Figures 1 and 2), In the left panel of each figure we depict the budget 
constraints, whereas in the right panel we display the withdrawal rates for earned income. 
We show the case of a person with a relatively high level of UA of 800 Euro. Thus, this 
person would belong to the upper quartile of UA recipients. We further assume a gross 
hourly wage rate of 15 Euro for the case of UA, and of 8 Euro for the case of SA. The 
monthly rent is set to 280 Euro.  
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Figure 1: UA-recipients: single mother with one child 
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Figure 2: SA-recipients: single mother with one child 
 
Unemployment benefit II 
With the Social Code II the Unemployment Benefit II (UB II) was introduced. It replaces UA 
and also SA for persons deemed to be labour force participants. It constitutes a "new" 
basic benefit for the working and the non-working poor. Simultaneously with the Social 
Code II the Social Code XII was introduced which regulates the new Social Assistance XII 
that covers the basic needs for persons or households in working age that are not eligible 
to UB II and are not retired. In order to qualify for UB II it is only required that at least one 
person in the household is able and willing to work a minimum of three hours a day, is 
between 15 and 65 years old - besides the income test. The household 
("Bedarfsgemeinschaft") comprises parents and their children, married or unmarried 
partners. The minimum income under UB II is slightly higher than it used to be under the 
old Social Assistance. This higher amount stems from the fact that transfer money for 
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specific needs like new clothes or new household appliances was substituted by a flat 
amount.2 The basic amount is 345 Euro. For each partner or adult child in the household 
80 percent of the basic amount are considered. E.g., for a couple without children the 
minimum income level (net of rent payments) is 621 Euro per month. There are 
supplementary payments for extraordinary situations (e.g. for single parents, for disabled, 
for special dietary requirements of sick persons etc.). For children, a lower monthly rate is 
considered. In general, the rent for "adequate housing" is added. As before 2005, 
allowances for earned income and for non-earned income exist. Moreover, an additional 
supplementary child allowance (Kinderzuschlag) was introduced for those "marginal" 
families who would become eligible for UB II without the additional child allowance. To 
keep these "marginal" families out of the UB II, the supplementary child allowance is paid 
in combination with housing benefits. The examples in the Figures 1 and 2 show what 
effects we can expect: Former recipients of UA will lose a lot of income if they used to 
receive high UA while former recipients of SA gain income because of the higher benefit 
rates and the less restrictive income withdrawal rates. In total, we expect a reduction of 
inequality because as can be seen in the example the budget curves for recipients of UA 
and SA become equal. 
 
MICROSIMULATION AND ESTIMATION 
 
In a static microsimulation the so-called "morning after" or "first-round" effect is estimated. 
It is assumed that the household will not change its behaviour and therefore it is only 
possible to observe the crude effect of a reform. In our study we also account for 
behavioural reactions or the so-called "second-round" labour effects. Therefore, we specify 
a model that allows behavioural reactions. The idea is that the household is allowed to 
decide which hours to work and also to change this decision. Using this information it is 
not only possible to calculate the distributional and labour supply effects separately. 
Moreover, it is possible to calculate the distributional effects with respect to the labour 
supply effects. In our study we use the behavioural ZEW microsimulation model (STSM) 
with an integrated household labour supply model. Our model has been used in earlier 
studies such as Arntz et al. (2004), Beninger et al. (2006), Beblo et al. (2004) and 
Jacobebbinghaus and Steiner (2003). 
 
                                                 
2 The irregular one-time payments in the old SA were simulated as an 18 percent add-on to the transferred amount of 
the benefit. 
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Data and simulation sample 
The ZEW micro-simulation model is based on the micro data of the latest two waves from 
2004 and 2005 of the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP).3 
The GSOEP consists of nearly 12,000 households, and is a representative sample of 
private households with information amongst others on household income, hours of work 
and household characteristics.4 
In our analysis we distinguish people as "flexible" to adjust labour supply and "inflexible" to 
adjust labour supply. Starting from the individual level a "flexible" person is in the working 
age of 20 to 65 years, does not participate in vocational training, military or civil services. 
Moreover, the individual should not be self-employed, on maternity leave, nor be on 
retirement. We continue our analysis on a selected simulation sample switching to 
household level and distinguishing the following Groups: In the first group, namely Group1, 
we select couple and single households that we define as "flexible". For the couple 
households both spouses are supposed to be "flexible". Group 2 contains only couples 
with one flexible spouse. Group 3 includes couples and singles with only inflexible people. 
Group 4 describes what we call the "selection remainder". In the simulation process Group 
4 drops out, so we lose accuracy. To circumvent this problem we apply a correction of the 
household sample weights.5 These are people or households with missing information and 
non-response. For simulating the tax-benefit model without any behavioural adjustments 
we can use Group 1 to 3. For the behavioural model only the Group 1 and 2 can be 
considered, because at least one person within the household ought to be flexible. The 
following Table 1 illustrates the structure of the simulation sample. 
 
Table 1: Weighted (unweighted) Simulation sample after the selection process 
group 1 2 3 N 
couples 8.71 Mill. (2603) 3.56 Mill (949) 5.53 Mill (1352) 17.8 Mill (4904) 
singles 8.21 Mill (1378) -- 10.08 Mill (1602) 18.29  Mill (980) 
households 16.92 Mill (3981) 3.56 Mill (949) 15.61 Mill (2954) 36.09 Mill (7884) 
Source: own calculations based on GSOEP 2004 and 2005 
 
 
Structural model of household labour supply 
In a standard theoretical framework a linear budget curve is derived from a continuum of 
                                                 
3A description of the German Socio Economic Panel is given by Haisken DeNew (2005) 
 
4 For people who are not working we lack the information about their gross hourly wage rate. To solve this we apply a 
wage regression with selection correction as proposed by Heckman (1976) 
 
5 See Appendix 4 in Jacobebbinghaus and Steiner (2003) 
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hours. The indifference curve then displays the preferences of the household regarding 
hours to work and consumption. In the osculation point of both curves the optimal hours of 
work and optimal consumption is derived. Introducing a tax and benefit system, in 
particular the German tax and benefit system, the budget curve becomes nonlinear 
because of the complexity of the system (e.g. there exist kink points which produce 
complications in a continuous framework that are cumbersome to solve).6  
Instead, we apply a discrete choice approach as suggested by van Soest (1995). This 
approach is favourable thereby that only a discrete number of hour points need to be 
considered from which the household can choose. As such, this framework copes with 
nonlinear budget curves circumventing the kink problem or allowing for non-convex budget 
sets. Furthermore, the empirical hours distribution of the households shows several peaks 
around particular hour categories suggesting that people might be bounded or restricted to 
a set of hours regarding the existing labour contracts and thus, supporting the discrete 
choice approach (See Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Distribution of weekly hours of work for Group1 
weekly hours of work singles couples 
 male female male female 
0-5[ 17% 22.9% 9.9% 29.7% 
5,15[ 0.8% 4.6% 0.6% 10% 
15-25[ 2% 7.8% 0.6% 17.9% 
25-35[ 3.8% 12.6% 1.9% 12.6% 
35-45[ 64.5% 47.6% 69.9% 27.1% 
>=45 11.8% 4.5% 17.2% 2.7% 
average hours 33.3h 26.6h 37.3h 20h 
observations 600 778 2603  
Source: own calculations based on GSOEP 2004 and 2005 
 
 
    Referring to the hour distribution, we construct our hours set for women and men 
separately. For women we choose the weekly hour categories {0, 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50}. 
Category 0 describes the decision not to work, while 10, 20 and 30 define part-time work, 
40 describes full-time employment and 50 defines overtime. For men we use a reduced 
set of hour categories because we nearly observe part-time work {0, 20, 40, 50}, (see 
Table 2). For each hour category and the 24(4x6) hour category combinations of couples 
with two flexible spouses we compute the respective outcomes like taxes, transfers, and 
disposable income by applying our microsimulation model. We assume that the individual 
hourly gross wage rate remains constant across the hour categories and that overtime if 
fully paid. 
                                                 
6 For a discussion on the kink problem see Moffitt (1990) and for nonlinear budget sets see Hausman (1985) 
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    We use a structural model of household labour supply to transfer the outcomes in 
behavioural responses of the households. In this structural model we assume that the 
decision maker chooses the category with the highest utility compared to the other 
categories. This is our first identifying assumption. Furthermore, we assume that couples 
are regarded as one decision maker by jointly maximizing their utility. This model is 
considered a unitary model of household labour supply.7 
We estimate household utility by using a translog utility function as proposed by van Soest 
(1995). For each individual we assume a weekly time endowment (TE) of 80 hours. This 
leads to  lmi  TE − hi   and  ii hTElf −=   where  lm   indicates the weekly leisure of a male 
and  lf   the weekly leisure of a female of the respective household  i . 
 
Ukxk   x k′Axk  ′xk  k                     (1) 
 Uk   represents the utility of category k. The column vector  xk   includes monthly 
disposable income and leisure of the household in natural logarithmlogyi, loglmi, loglfi. . 
The unobserved part is defined by  k   which is assumed to be  iid  . The symmetric 3x3 
matrix A contains the coefficients of the interactions and quadratic terms of the included 
variables and the vector  β   contains the coefficients of the linear terms. The probability of 
a decision maker now choosing category k instead of category l is given by: 
 
Prk  PrUk  Ul   Prxk′ Axk  ′xk  − x l′Ax l  ′x l   l − k ,∀l ≠ k              (2) 
 
In order to solve the equation it is necessary to make a distributional assumption about the 
unobserved part of the utility function. In particular, it is assumed that the density for each 
unobserved part of the utility function is 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )jjjf εεε −−⋅−= expexpexp                   (3) 
 
and the c.d.f. 
                                                 
7 An extension of that would be to focus on intra-household sharing of incomes which has been done by Beninger and 
Laisney (2002). 
 
 11
 Fj   exp−exp−j                      (4) 
 
The distribution is called Gumbel or  type I extreme value distribution. While assuming this 
distribution for the unobserved part, it can be shown that the difference of the unobserved 
parts follows a logit distribution (McFadden 1974, 2001). The probability of choosing 
category  k   can thus be written as 
 
( ) ( )( ) klxAxx xAxxkXUU mmm
m
kkk
lkk ≠∀′+∑
′+===> ′
′
,
exp
exp
)Pr(Pr β
β                (5) 
 
The parameters of the conditional logit model are then estimated by maximum likelihood, 
assuming the IIA-assumption holds (See Equation 6). 
 
( )∏∏
= =
==
n
i
m
j
dijjHL
1 1
Pr                    (6) 
Where  describes the choice probability of category( jH =Pr ) j , and  is defined as 
indicator which takes the value  if household  has chosen category 
ijd
1=ijd i j and 0 if not. 
  
Distribution Analysis 
Before applying a distributional analysis, it is necessary to distinguish two mechanisms. 
The distributional effects consist of the direct effects caused by the change of the 
disposable incomes and the indirect effects that are due to the re-financing of the benefit 
payment. Latter results from the fact that the UB II is tax financed and so the aim would be 
also to target who will have to carry the redistribution costs. This would demand a general 
equilibrium model, because several carryover effects would have to be taken into account, 
which is rather difficult in a partial equilibrium framework. So the question is to focus either 
on the disposable income or the household consumption to measure the direct effects. 
The GSOEP does not provide information on non-earned income, consumption or 
accumulated rights to pensions. Thus, we focus our analysis on comparing the disposable 
household incomes that are calculated with our ZEW-microsimulation model. The 
disposable household incomes are then modified by equivalence scales to account for 
differences in the size of the households. The same context is also used by the 
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Government and the European Union (EU). To check for robustness we apply different 
concepts of equivalence scales, like the international expert scale, OECD and modified 
OECD. The concepts we use for measuring the income inequality are the Gini-coefficient 
and the measures proposed by Atkinson (1970). In general, the income gainers and losers 
are detected by performing a percentile analysis; while specific a poverty analysis focuses 
on that part of the income distribution that is below a minimal standard. The problem is that 
there exists no real consensus about what defines a minimal standard, although there are 
several definitions of understanding poverty8. We use the measures of Foster, Greer and 
Thorbeeke (1984) that also belong to the family of axiomatic poverty measures that have 
been established by Sen (1976). We use FGT (0), FGT (1) and FGT (2). FGT (0) displays 
the poverty rate, calculating the number of heads below the minimal standard. FGT (1) 
defines the standardised poverty gap ratio and FGT (2) the squared standardised poverty 
gap ratio. Because the latter measures the squared gap of the income to the poverty line, 
higher income gaps receive a higher weight. 
In a first step of our analysis, we calculate the disposable equivalence income relying to 
the scales mentioned above. This defines our status quo, or the benchmark scenario. In a 
second step the changes of the regime are applied and the counterfactual incomes are 
calculated. For the following description of the methodology that is used we define the 
income in the status quo as: 
 
yv i0                       (7) 
 
For the reform scenario we define respectively: 
 
yv i1                           (8) 
 
where the superscript 1 now indicates the reform scenario. As this method does not take 
into account the behavioural adjustments we call it simple simulation. This "simple 
simulation" produces the "morning-after effect". Considering behavioural reactions makes 
the method more complicated as we will demonstrate in the following. 
The conditional logit estimation produces a probabilistic distribution on the discrete hour 
categories as discussed in Section 3. As such, it is not clear how to compare disposable 
                                                 
8See Sen (1983) for example. 
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incomes before and after the reform. In this framework the standard formulas for inequality 
and poverty measures cannot be applied. One method would be to use the expected 
income which results from the probabilities for each category multiplied with the respective 
disposable income calculated at this category. Other methods would be the random 
sampling method or the pseudo distribution method. For the random sampling method a 
specified number of incomes are drawn from the underlying income distribution and the 
measures are calculated as averages of the draws. The pseudo distribution method is 
characterised thereby that the disposable income for each category is treated as a 
separate observation. This establishes the pseudo distribution with household weights 
relative to the estimated probability of the category. Creedy et al. (2004) find that that the 
expected income method results in a less accurate approximation of the true inequality 
measures compared to random sampling methods and the pseudo distribution method. In 
contrast, the pseudo distribution method leads to outcomes that converge quickly to the 
true values that had been simulated. According to Creedy et al. (2004) the pseudo 
distribution method is superior to the random sampling method. Thus, we also apply the 
pseudo distribution method. This leads to the following structure: 
 
( )ijiij xRjHfyv ;0;0 ===                    (9) 
 
( )ijiij xRjHfyv ;1;1 ===                  (10) 
 
where the subscript  i  indicates the household and j the category. So the disposable 
income  yv ij
R
  is a function of the chosen hour category, the scenario, where R=0 indicates 
the status quo and some individual and category specific characteristics, expressed in  x ij  
The pseudo distribution method is applied by multiplying the household weights with the 
estimated probabilities of the respective hour category for the status quo and the reform 
scenario with  R  0,1   (see Equation 11). 
 
hhweightspijR  hhweightsi  pijR , with ∑
j1
m
hhweightspijR  hhweightsi
                (11) 
 
We define this method as "labour income simulation", because it refers to the estimation of 
the household labour supply model which produces the hour probabilities to measure 
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behavioural reactions. In the following, we distinguish the results as simulation without 
behavioural reactions (nob) and simulation with behavioural reactions (wb). For the 
simulation without behavioural reactions we apply the disposable income  yv if
1
  of the 
reform scenario and the modified household weights of the status quo  hhweightspij
0
  (see 
Equation 12). In order to analyse the behavioural reactions, we use the disposable income 
of the reform scenario yv if
1
  and the modified household weights of the reform scenario  
hhweightspij1   (see Equation 13). The difference of Equation (13) and Equation (12) evolves 
the pure behavioural effect. 
 
yv ij10  yv ij1  hhweightspij0                   (12) 
yv ij11  yv ij1  hhweightspij1                   (13) 
 
RESULTS 
 
Household labour supply effects 
    As Table 2 illustrated, we detect differences in the distribution of the hours of work 
between single and couple and within single households between men and women. 
Therefore we estimate our conditional logit model separately for couples, single women 
and single men, and for couple households with only one flexible spouse. We interact the 
category-specific variables income and leisure with category invariant variables like age, 
age squared, education level, region, and nationality. For females we additionally interact 
with children in the age till 6 years, from 7 to 16 years and from 17 years. In addition, we 
build dummy variables for full-time employment for both sexes and for women also for 
part-time employment to cover the fix costs of working part or fulltime. The results for 
couples show that most of the variables are highly significant. We check the theoretical 
assumption of concavity by analysing the derivations and the minors of the Hessian 
matrices. The demanded theoretical quality of our model that utility rises with a decreasing 
marginal rate with higher leisure and with higher income is fulfilled. We continue estimating 
the labour supply elasticities numerically by rising the gross earned income about one 
percent (See Table 3). If the gross-income of the male spouse is increased by one 
percent, the woman reduces her participation about 0.02 percentage points while she 
reduces working hours about 0.05 percent. This result implies that if the male's income 
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increases the woman substitutes work with leisure. One explanation could be the tax-
splitting system which produces higher marginal tax rates for women if the husband is 
working fulltime or that women are more likely to take care of their children. The male 
spouse increases his participation about 0.16 percentage points and his working hours 
about 0.24 percent if his gross income increases about one percent. He also increases his 
participation and his working time if the gross income of the female spouse increases. One 
explanation for this result could be that male spouses could feel themselves in competition 
with their successful women. For single households the elasticities are quite similar for 
single women and single men with 0.17 and 0.18 percentage points, while the hours 
effects are much higher for single women with 0.38 to 0.23 percent for men. This is very 
similar for couples with one inflexible partner while the hour effects are 0.2 for men and 
0.36. 
 
Table 3: Labour supply elasticities 
 participation effect hours effect 
 (in percentage points) (in percentage) 
 male female male female 
couples     
income male spouse (+ 1 percent) 
0.16 -0.02 0.24 -0.05 
income female spouse (+ 1 percent) 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.37 
singles     
income (+ 1 percent) 0.17 0.18 0.23 0.38 
couples with one flexible spouse     
income (+ 1 percent) 0.17 0.18 0.2 0.38 
Source: own calculations based on GSOEP 2004 and 2005 
 
 
In a next step we account for the labour supply effects that are likely to result from the 
reform by comparing the participation rate in the status quo with the reform scenario. The 
results are presented in Table 4. The negative participation effects are mainly dominated 
by couples with one flexible spouse. Among these households, especially women reduce 
their participation. In general, the negative effects are driven by households who become 
eligible for UB II in the reform scenario and who did not receive any benefits in the status 
quo. Negative effects are also found for single mothers and married women if children are 
in the household. This seems plausible, because usually women have to take care of the 
children. In an opposite direction, positive effects are found for single men and single 
women and for couples without children. The total effects do not significantly vary from 
zero. 
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Table 4: participation effects in Western and Eastern Germany 
 Couples, two flexible Singles Couples, one flexible 
 Women Men Women Men Women Men 
 in 
persons 
in % in 
persons 
in % in 
persons
in % in  
persons
in % in  
persons 
in % in  
persons
in %
West 
no kids 
15248 0.42 21290 0.58 12170 0.44 26083 0.85 -24737 -1.29 1458 0.31
East 
no kids 
1696  0.17 708 0.07 1881 0.35 794 0.11 -14682 -3.58 -326 -0.19
West 
kids 
-16125 -0.45 16631 0.46 -32430 -3.80 -628 -1.47 -11005 -3.56 -5437 3.71
East 
kids 
-319 -0.07 1958 0.44 -4433 -2.24 -22 -0.18 -3169 -2,71 1522 3.4
Total 500 -0.01 40586 0.47 -22812 -0.52 26226 0.68 -53594 -1.95 -2783-0.34
Source: own calculations based on GSOEP 2004 and 2005 
 
Results of the Distribution Analysis 
    Having established our estimation model we proceed with the distribution analysis. As 
mentioned in Section 4 we conduct our analysis with the "labour income simulation" 
method. In a first step we apply our analysis to the whole simulation sample. In a next step 
we build subgroups for different states. The first subgroup we specify as "Group A". This 
Group contains all people who are “Affected” by the reform. Furthermore, we create 
subgroups for the people who received UA, SA, also including people who received both, 
and people who received no benefits in the status quo.9 The analysis of the subgroups for 
UA and SA include people that become eligible for UB II, people who pass over to the 
"new" SA and people who lose their entitlement. 
    In the following the results are based on the international expert scale, because it is the 
most commonly used scale. Furthermore, applying the international expert scale reduces 
the equivalence income less if the number of people within the household increases. Due 
to the fact that the results show an observable sensitivity according to the equivalence 
scale that has been chosen, Atkinson (1998). Therefore, we extend our analysis also to 
the OECD and the modified OECD scale.10 
    As shown in Figure 3 the rounded Gini-coefficient remains unchanged for the entire 
population at 0.27 while a reduction of inequality can be measured by looking at "Group A" 
as we had expected. 
                                                 
9 The tables with the results for the other subgroups can be received by the authors upon request 
 
10 The results for the different scales can be received by the authors upon request 
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Figure 3: Gini-coefficient 
 
Here the Gini-coefficient falls from 0.18 to 0.14. This result is very similar for people with 
former UA and even stronger for people without benefits in the status quo. The Gini-
coefficient for people with SA slightly increases. The Atkinson measures also confirm a 
reduction of income inequality for "Group A" and also for the sample simulation. The 
effects are in general stronger for the Atkinson measures as compared to the Gini-
coefficient (see Figure 4). These general results reflect the quality of the Gini-coefficient, 
because it is more sensitive to deciles with more observations. The Atkinson measures on 
the other side are more sensitive to changes in the bottom deciles; therefore we observe 
stronger effects.11 
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Figure 4: Atkinson measures 
 
For people with UA the Atkinson measures also show a reduction of income inequality 
within that subgroup while for people with SA, the Atkinson measures denote a slight 
increase in income inequality. These effects become more explicit with behavioural 
adjustments (wb). In the following poverty analysis the results show the same directions as 
the inequality analysis. The head count ratio (FGT0) of the sample population, which 
indicates the poverty rate, slightly declines and more distinct for "Group A". The 
standardised poverty gap ratio (FGT1) and the squared standardised poverty gap ratio 
                                                 
11 For a discussion on the properties of the Gini-coefficient see Cowell (1985), Blackorby and Donaldson (1978), 
Atkinson (1970) and Sen (1973) 
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(FGT2) decline for the whole simulation sample and within "Group A" (see Figure 5). 
These results suggest that the distance to the poverty line becomes smaller, especially for 
Group A. Here the share of people below the poverty line is reduced by 15 percent.  
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Figure 5: Foster-Greer-Thorbeeke measures 
 
For people with UA, the poverty rate is increasing about two percentage points while for 
recipients of former SA there is a reduction of two percentage points. The results for UA 
that the income inequality has declined combined with an increase of the poverty rate, 
leads to the conclusion that redistribution from the top to the bottom must have taken 
place. This becomes clearer by looking at the percentile analysis (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Percentile analysis 
 
As we can see from the percentile analysis for the simulation sample, the two bottom 
deciles are the income gainers of the reform. The income losers are detected in the 3th to 
8th decile.  Within the Group A, the top two deciles are losing the most income per capita 
while the bottoms are gaining most income. These income profits of the bottom two deciles 
diminish until the 8th decile. The income losses found in the higher deciles are mainly 
driven by former recipients of higher UA. 
 If we consider the number of children in a household, we detect that the gains are 
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increasing with the number of children which is consistent for the entire population and 
"Group A" (see Figure 7). This finding results from the fact, that benefit payments for 
children – these are calculated relatively to the basic benefit - have become more 
generous due to the higher basic benefit rate. 
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Figure 7: Children analysis 
 
All together, we can summarize that we identify most of the losers in the group of the 
people with former UA. Here, we identify six deciles (seven deciles) as income losers with 
behavioural response (without behavioural response). This finding is agreement with 
Schulte (2004), Blos and Rudolph (2005), Becker and Hauser (2006). In contrast, we find 
reform winners in the subgroup of people with former SA for almost all deciles. This can be 
explained by the less restrictive income withdrawal rates and the higher rates for children 
as mentioned above. In addition, we observe the strongest reform winners in the group of 
people without benefit payments in the status quo. While the former result for SA is 
plausible and in the direction we expected, the latter result is – although plausible as well– 
also influenced by the structure of our tax-benefit model: The GSOEP contains only 
insufficient information on the non-earned income. We only observe the yearly interest 
incomes together with incomes from dividends. So, we assume an interest rate of 3 
percent to recalculate the potential capital assets. These calculated assets serve us as 
basis for the wealth test. This leads to the result that a lot of people become eligible 
because they were not entitled for UA and they had too many private assets by law to 
receive SA. Within this group nine out of ten deciles are winning, so this group of people 
become the strongest income gainers of the reform. A main aspect of our analysis was the 
consideration of behavourial responses. A such, the results show, that in general, taking 
into account behavioural reactions mitigate the negative distribution effects of the reform 
on one side and boost the positive effects on the other side.  This implies that the 
households adjust their behaviour in an optimal way to improve their income situation.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Our distribution analysis of the "Hartz-4-Reform" is the first attempt to cover the entire 
population. Furthermore, we are the first who account for the "second-round" effects by 
allowing behavioural adjustments. We used the pseudo-distribution method which is a 
simple and sufficient approach in a probabilistic framework when focussing on issues of 
income distribution. 
The main results of our analysis are the following: The introduction of UB II has led to a 
consolidation of the benefit system. The presumption that people who used to receive high 
UA-benefits because they had higher earnings (before unemployment) are losing most is 
confirmed. We find that six deciles (seven deciles) are losing income as a consequence of 
the reform with consideration of behavioural effects (without behavioural effects). Our 
results correspond with the findings of other studies like Becker and Hauser (2006), 
Schulte (2004) and Blos and Rudolph (2005) regarding the recipients of former UA. We 
identify reform winners in the subgroups of (1) former recipients of social assistance and of 
(2) new recipients. The largest gains accrue to households with many children and to 
households who have not been eligible for any benefits before. These households become 
eligible, because of the less restrictive non-earned-income test compared to the old social 
assistance. For the whole group of benefit recipients, namely "Group A", we find a 
reduction of the income inequality accompanied by a positive effect on poverty measures. 
This effect is in line with the theoretical considerations. The new benefit system has a 
tendency to equalize the transfer payments on a level that is slightly higher than the old 
social assistance level. These results are also confirmed by the labour supply effects.  We 
find negative participation effects for women with children in couple and single households.  
In the opposite, couples without children, single men and women without children increase 
their participation. These contrary effects nearly cancel out and are not significant in either 
direction. Thus, the net employment effect of the reform is negligible.  
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